hypothesis testing and will not distinguish between the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson theories.
An alternative approach to hypothesis testing based on Bayesian principles is less familiar to social scientists but provides the basis for an important model selection criterion, the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz 1978; Raftery 1986 ). Advocates of the Bayesian approach argue that it provides a superior approach to model selection .
A third approach to model selection aims at finding an approximate model rather than a true model. A criterion based on this approach, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), is widely used in some disciplines but has received little attention in sociology. The articles in this special issue provide an introduction to the AIC. Stine's (2004 [this issue] ) article discusses its basis in information theory, while Kuha (2004 [this issue ]) provides a comparison to the BIC. Burnham and Anderson (2004 [this issue] ) also compare the AIC to the BIC and seek to specify the situations in which one will be superior to the other. Burnham and Anderson also argue for the advantages of model averaging over selecting a single model.
This introduction provides a background to the articles, focusing on the ways in which both the AIC and BIC differ from classical hypothesis tests.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
When hypothesis testing first came to be used in sociology, it was the subject of considerable debate.
1 Some sociologists-notably, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) -consciously avoided the use of hypothesis tests. However, no clear alternative methods of model selection were proposed, so hypothesis testing grew in importance as advances in computing made it easier to estimate additional models. By the late 1970s, hypothesis tests were the dominant method of model selection, although some researchers used various ad hoc criteria. The situation began to change when Raftery (1986) proposed a statistic for model selection that he dubbed the "Bayesian information criterion" or BIC.
2 If L is the maximized log likelihood, p is the number of free parameters in the model, and N is the number of cases, the BIC can be written as follows:
with a smaller value indicating a better fit. 3 In the case of the classical regression model with normally distributed errors, the BIC is
where σ is the standard error of the regression. The BIC almost immediately became popular in sociology, although it did not replace conventional hypothesis tests. Some contemporary researchers rely primarily on the BIC, some use a combination of the BIC and classical hypothesis tests, and others do not use the BIC at all. Since the BIC and classical tests sometimes lead to substantially different conclusions, the choice is of considerable practical importance. The BIC, however, is not the only alternative to classical tests. In fact, as Kuha (2004) points out, there is a veritable "alphabet" of model selection criteria. The great majority of these criteria, however, are asymptotically equivalent to one of two criteria: the BIC or the AIC. 4 The AIC, which was first proposed by Akaike (1973) , can be written as follows:
In the classical regression model with normally distributed errors, the AIC is
As with the BIC, smaller values are better. The AIC and BIC have the same form: −2 log L plus a penalty for each free parameter in the model. The difference between the BIC and AIC is simply the size of the penalty: 2 for the AIC and log(N) for the BIC.
5 As a result of this difference, the BIC will favor smaller models-that is, models with fewer parameters-than the AIC. For example, if N = 1,000, the penalty in the BIC is approximately 6.9.
At most sample sizes, the BIC will favor smaller models than classical hypothesis tests. For example, if a single parameter is added to a model, the smaller model will be rejected at the 5 percent level if the change in −2 log L is greater than 3.92. The BIC will favor the larger model if the change in −2 log L is greater than log(N). Thus, if N is greater than about 50, then the BIC sets a higher standard than a hypothesis test with a critical value of .05. When comparing models that differ by one parameter, the AIC sets the least demanding standard: 2.0, regardless of sample size. For models that differ by a large number of parameters, the AIC may set a higher standard than classical tests. For example, the 5 percent critical value for a chi-square test with 10 degrees of freedom is 18.3, while the AIC favors the larger model if the reduction in chi-square is greater than 20.
Although the AIC was proposed before the BIC, it is not often used in sociology. A search of JSTOR finds only 16 mentions in sociological journals versus more than 100 for the BIC. 6 The AIC, however, is quite popular in some other fields: Economics journals in JSTOR contain about 120 mentions of the AIC and only about 100 of the BIC. 7 Many sociologists have some acquaintance with the AIC, if only because it is also included as part of the standard output in some statistical packages, but few seem to be familiar with its theoretical rationale. The articles in this special issue help to fill this gap. Stine (2004) discusses the AIC in relation to information theory. In general, information theory is concerned with finding the most efficient way to summarize quantitative information. It is relevant to model selection because the parameter estimates from a model can be thought of as a way to summarize part of the information in the data. The question in model selection is how much additional information a parameter must add to justify the "cost" of its inclusion. Moreover, the likelihood can be thought of as a measure of information (Lindsey 1996:101) . Consequently, the natural form for model selection criteria will be the likelihood with an adjustment or "penalty" for each parameter used. Stine discusses the rationale for the penalties used in the AIC and BIC. However, he argues that model selection criteria should also take account of the number of independent variables considered for inclusion. Without an adjustment for the scope of the search, both the AIC and BIC may favor models with too many parameters. Kuha (2004) provides a comparison of the AIC and BIC. As he notes, the usual rationales for the two criteria are very different. While the AIC is intended to select an approximate model, the BIC is based on a hypothesis test-that is, it is designed to find the true model. It is, however, possible to argue for each criterion from the point of view of the other. That is, under certain assumptions, the AIC is a Bayesian hypothesis test, and under other assumptions, the BIC is an optimal summary of the information in the data. 8 Kuha concludes by suggesting that researchers should make use of both criteria and illustrates this point with an analysis of two well-known data sets on social mobility.
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE
The article by Burnham and Anderson (2004) summarizes and extends the discussion in their comprehensive work on model selection (Burnham and Anderson 2002) . After discussing the theoretical case for the AIC, they provide a simulation analysis comparing the performance of the AIC and BIC under different assumptions about the true values of parameters, and they also discuss the use of the AIC in multimodel inference.
The remainder of this introduction discusses the differences between model selection criteria, including both the AIC and the BIC, and classical hypothesis tests. This issue is of basic importance: Before asking whether we should use the AIC or the BIC, we should examine the case for abandoning the use of classical tests for model selection. This discussion, however, is not a prerequisite for understanding any of the articles and might be regarded as either an introduction or an afterward.
The use of classical hypothesis tests has been the subject of considerable debate in some disciplines, notably psychology and economics. The controversy has involved a wide variety of practical, statistical, and philosophical issues. Hence, rather than trying to provide a comprehensive overview, I will identify some central issues and discuss them in an informal fashion. 9 Also, I will consider only objections to the principles of classical hypothesis tests, not problems of popular misunderstanding or misuse.
The fundamental issue is that the idea of a true model is problematic, particularly in the social sciences (Fox 1997:3-6) . For example, consider the relationship between two variables. Neither experience nor theory gives us any reason to expect that the relationship will be exactly linear or, indeed, will conform exactly to any simple functional form. Hence, a researcher who uses a linear model need not believe that it represents the truth, only that it provides a good approximation. As Box (1979) put it, "All models are false, but some are useful" (p. 202). Hypothesis tests, however, assume the existence of a true model. Can a method designed to select a true model be useful in selecting an approximate model? Some observers suggest the answer is yes, as long as hypothesis tests are not interpreted in a rigid fashion. According to Sprott (2000) , for example, "Rather than speaking in terms of true and false, accept or reject, it is better to think in terms of whether H is an adequate working hypothesis, or whether the data contradict H enough for H to be of questionable use" (p. 87). Others argue that Bayesian tests are useful for model selection, but classical tests are not. In this view, Bayesian tests of the hypothesis θ = 0 are also effective in screening out "small" effects (Berger and Delampady 1987:320-2; Raftery 1995:117) . A third view is that model selection and hypothesis testing are entirely different tasks, and different tools should be used for each.
I begin by summarizing some of the objections that have been raised against classical hypothesis tests. I then outline Bayesian hypothesis testing and the Bayesian approach that underlies the BIC, briefly discuss the relationship between model selection and cross-validation, and consider the AIC and BIC in light of the criticisms of classical hypothesis tests. The concluding section suggests that classical hypothesis tests are not well suited to model selection and that a model selection criterion such as the AIC or BIC should be used for this task. In the conclusion, I suggest that hypothesis tests should be used to consider the direction of effects rather than the hypothesis of a zero effect.
OBJECTIONS TO CLASSICAL HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Classical hypothesis testing usually involves nested models-that is, cases in which one model is a special case of the other-but can be extended to cover nonnested models (Cox 1962; Halaby and Weakliem 1993) . This discussion will assume that the models under consideration are nested, although the basic points also apply to nonnested hypothesis testing. The form of hypothesis most commonly tested is that of a "point" or "sharp" null hypothesis: that is, θ = k, where θ is a parameter and k is a constant specified in advance. Usually, the hypothesis tested is θ = 0, but sometimes other values of k are considered. In either case, the model implied by the null hypothesis is simpler, in the sense of having fewer parameters, than that implied by the alternative hypothesis.
The hypothesis θ ≤ k could be tested against the alternative θ > k. This is commonly referred to as a "one-tailed" test. The results of a one-tailed test do not justify the elimination of parameters from a model. For example, removal of an independent variable from a regression is equivalent to assuming that its coefficient is equal to zero, so failing to reject the hypothesis that it is less than or equal to zero does not justify removal. Hence, the discussion in this section is limited to two-tailed tests, although I return to one-tailed tests in the conclusion.
One of the earliest and most prominent objections to classical hypothesis testing is that the results are strongly influenced by sample size. Experience shows that in large samples, nearly all hypotheses are rejected, so the use of hypothesis tests for model selection leads to very complex models. An early statement of this point was given by Berkson (1938) :
As a matter of observation, when the numbers in the data are quite large, the P's tend to come out small. . . . I make the following dogmatic statement, referring for illustration to the normal curve: "If the normal curve is fitted to a body of data representing any real observations whatever of quantities in the physical world, then if the number of observations is extremely large-for instance, on an order of 200,000-the Chi-square P will be small beyond any usual limit of significance." Many subsequent authors have made similar observations. For example, Raftery (1986) states that classical tests are "designed to detect any discrepancies between model and reality. Such discrepancies do exist, by definition, although if the model is satisfactory, they should be small. With a large enough sample, [classical tests] will find them and reject even a good model" (p. 145).
Another objection is that classical hypothesis tests do not always identify a single best model. There may be several models that cannot be rejected against any alternative. For example, suppose we estimate a regression including two independent variables, x and z, and find that neither parameter estimate is significantly different from zero. Then we estimate a model with only x and reject the hypothesis of no effect. Finally, we estimate a model with only z and again reject the hypothesis of no effect. In this case, the null model can be rejected, but y = f (x) and y = f (z) cannot be rejected against y = f (x, z). Thus, we are left with two possible models. In this case, it seems reasonable to choose between those models by selecting the one with the higher R 2 . However, if one begins with more candidate independent variables, it is possible to end with alternative models containing different degrees of freedom. In this case, it is not reasonable to simply select the one with the highest R 2 . Moreover, even if the models under consideration have the same number of parameters, we would usually like to say something about how strongly the evidence favors y = f (x) over y = f (z). For example, suppose that the regression of y on x gives an R 2 of .25, while the regression of y on z gives an R 2 of .20. If one is compelled to choose between these two models, it is clear that y = f (x) should be preferred, but it is not clear how strongly it should be preferred.
Another problem is that the choice of significance level is essentially arbitrary. The emphasis on the .05 level is simply a conventionin principle, there is no reason to prefer it to other levels. In fact, reliance on standard significance levels is difficult to justify. In principle, the level of significance should be chosen based on the relative cost of rejecting a true null hypothesis and incorrectly failing to reject a false one (Hansen 1999:196) . When considering a particular hypothesis, it is possible to present the p value and let readers make their own judgment about the appropriate decision. However, the models presented in a research report are often selected by a complex sequence of hypothesis tests. In this case, performing the tests in a different order or using a different significance level can lead to substantially different models (Granger, King, and White 1995:186) .
Perhaps the most general concern is that classical hypothesis testing does not treat models symmetrically. The smaller model can be rejected but can never receive positive support. Although adherents of Popper's (1959) philosophy of science will probably regard this as appropriate, other observers regard it as unnatural (Granger et al. 1995 ). An alternative is to consider the weight of evidence in favor of each model. That is, the evidence might support the smaller model, the larger model, or be indifferent between them.
BAYESIAN HYPOTHESIS TESTING
A Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing was developed by Jeffreys (1961) but was not widely used until the 1980s. In a Bayesian approach, it is meaningful to speak of the probability of a model. Based on one's prior beliefs about the probability of each model and the observed data, one can compute a "posterior" probability. The likelihood of a model is the probability of the observed data under the assumption that the model is true. Hence, the ratio of the likelihoods, sometimes known as the "Bayes factor," can be interpreted as the weight of evidence provided by the data. The simplest case occurs when both models specify a particular value for a parameter. For example, if one hypothesis is θ = 0 and another is θ = 1, one can simply calculate L(x|θ = 1)/L(x|θ = 0). If the ratio is greater than 1.0, the evidence favors θ = 1; if the ratio is less than 1.0, it favors θ = 0.
In most cases, however, substantive theories do not specify a specific value for all hypotheses. Hence, in classical tests, one hypothesis is usually θ = 0. In Bayesian tests, this kind of specification is not adequate: A hypothesis must give a probability distribution over all values of θ . An example of an acceptable alternative hypothesis would be a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1 over all values excluding zero.
The Bayes factor for the null hypothesis θ = 0 against the alternative θ = 0 is given by
where f (θ) is the prior probability distribution for θ in the alternative hypothesis. The numerator is simply the maximized likelihood given θ = 0, while the denominator is a weighted sum of the maximized likelihoods of the data at all values of θ possible under the alternative hypothesis. At some of these values, the likelihood is larger than at θ = 0, but at other values, it may be smaller. For example, suppose that the maximum likelihood estimate of θ is .25. At values of θ around .25, the likelihoods will be larger than at θ = 0, but at values of less than zero or substantially more than .25, they will be smaller. The overall likelihood of the alternative hypothesis would depend on the weights given to these values. In other words, the likelihood will depend on how the alternative hypothesis is specified. Intuitively, it might seem that a researcher could represent the alternative hypothesis by a relatively flat distribution with large variance: for example, a uniform distribution over all values of θ that seem even remotely possible. 10 In effect, this would mean that θ could have almost any value, and no value is substantially more likely than another. This kind of distribution, however, produces a low likelihood for the alternative hypothesis since most of the probability will be far away from the maximum likelihood estimate of θ .
The preceding point represents an important difference between Bayesian hypothesis testing and Bayesian estimation. In Bayesian estimation, using a prior distribution with a large variance means that the estimates are dominated by the sample data and will therefore be essentially identical to conventional estimates. In Bayesian hypothesis testing, however, there is no "neutral" choice for the prior distribution. It is also important to note that the influence of the prior distribution of θ on the Bayes factor does not decline with sample size. That is, different prior distributions will produce different Bayes factors, regardless of the sample size.
Although the Bayes factor can vary widely, it is possible to obtain some general formulas that apply under reasonably broad assumptions (Raftery 1995:130-2) . Specifically, a Taylor series expansion for −2 times the integrated log likelihood of a model is the following:
Since the model may have multiple parameters, θ is a vector. The first term is simply −2 times the maximized log likelihood of the unrestricted model. The BIC is obtained by omitting the second, third, fifth, and sixth terms. The second term is the prior probability of θ* under the model, the third is the number of parameters times a constant, the fifth is the expected value of the information matrix normalized to a single observation, and the sixth represents various omitted terms. The BIC will be close to (6) if the prior distribution of the parameters is equivalent to the information in one representative case from the sample but will not necessarily be close if the prior distribution is different (Weakliem 1999) .
From a Bayesian point of view, the ideal analysis is one in which the investigator thinks about his or her own beliefs and the beliefs of other reasonable observers, represents them by a probability distribution, and calculates the resulting Bayes factors. This type of analysis, however, is very demanding. It is no easy task to precisely specify one's own expectations, and identifying the range of views held by other people is even more difficult. Consequently, some Bayesians have tried to find limits for broad classes of distributions. In particular, it seems reasonable to represent the hypothesis θ = 0 by a symmetric unimodal prior distribution with a mean of zero. Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963) investigated the Bayes factors that resulted from normal distributions. They found that the minimum Bayes factor for a t ratio of 2.6 is .154, or only about 6.5-to-1 odds against the null hypothesis. That is, a t ratio of 2.6, although "highly significant" by conventional standards, provides no more than moderate evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Moreover, this value is attained only when a specific variance is chosen: For other choices of variance, the evidence is less favorable to the alternative and sometimes favors the null hypothesis. Berger and Delampady (1987) and Berger and Sellke (1987) extended these results to all symmetric unimodal prior distributions centered at zero. For example, the minimum Bayes factor possible with a t ratio of 2.6 is .109, or about 9-to-1 odds against the null hypothesis (Berger and Delampady 1987:323) .
Thus, Bayes factors for testing sharp null hypotheses are considerably more favorable to the null hypothesis than conventional interpretations of "statistical significance." Berger and Sellke (1987) suggest replacing conventional standards of significance by a rule of thumb in which "t = 1 means no evidence against H 0 , t = 2 means only mild evidence . . . t = 3 means significant evidence . . . and t = 4 means highly significant evidence," but with the reservation that "even this may be overstating the evidence against H 0 " (p. 120).
Consequently, although Bayes factors are affected by the way that the alternative hypothesis is specified, the tendency to prefer smaller models is a general feature of the Bayesian approach to testing sharp null hypotheses, not a peculiarity of the BIC.
Another common feature of all Bayesian tests of sharp null hypotheses is that the improvement in fit that is required to add another parameter increases with the logarithm of N. Thus, the tendency to select smaller models than classical tests becomes stronger in larger samples. Consequently, even if using the BIC does not produce the same decisions as carrying out a Bayesian analysis with a specific prior distribution, it will usually come closer than would the use of classical tests or the AIC. From a Bayesian point of view, the BIC can be regarded as a reasonable all-purpose model selection criterion, although not as a substitute for a full Bayesian analysis.
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THE AIC, BIC, AND CROSS-VALIDATION
As Stine (2004) and Kuha (2004) explain in their articles, the AIC was originally derived from information theory. Several other authors, however, have arrived at essentially the same formula by other routes. A particularly interesting example is the relationship of the AIC to "leave-one-out" cross-validation (Stone 1977) . In cross-validation, the parameters of the model are estimated using N − 1 cases and used to predict the value of the remaining case. If this procedure is repeated for all N possible subsets, the sum of squared prediction errors can be used as a measure of the performance of the model. Stone (1977) showed that choosing the model with the lowest AIC is asymptotically equivalent to choosing the models with the best performance in "leave-one-out" cross-validation. Maddala (1988) and Hurvich (1997) discuss several other asymptotically equivalent criteria.
However, it cannot simply be said that choosing the AIC will give better predictive performance. More recent work has shown that the BIC is also related to the more general form of crossvalidation in which d cases are left out. Shao (1997:234) shows that generalized cross-validation is asymptotically equivalent to different model selection criteria, depending on the number of omitted cases.
Only if d/N goes to zero as N approaches infinity is cross-validation asymptotically equivalent to the AIC. If d/N approaches 1, crossvalidation is equivalent to using a penalty that increases with sample size. In effect, if we use an increasing proportion of the sample to give predictions about the remaining part, the AIC will perform best; if we use a decreasing proportion, the BIC will perform better. It is not clear which situation is more relevant to empirical research. In principle, predictive performance outside the sample is probably of most interest, but no model selection criterion is unambiguously superior in this respect.
COMPARISON OF THE AIC, BIC, AND CLASSICAL HYPOTHESIS TESTS
Unlike classical hypothesis tests, the AIC and BIC provide a ranking of all models. That is, it is possible to say that one model fits best, unless a tie happens to occur. Both also give a measure of the degree to which one model is superior to another. The BIC has the additional advantage that the difference can be converted into statements about relative probability. With the AIC, in contrast, it is not possible to say if a given difference is large or small in an absolute sense. Both criteria can show that a smaller model is better than a larger model, rather than merely that it is not rejected against the larger model. With the AIC, this is simply evidence that the smaller model will provide better predictions when using the parameter estimates from the sample. With the BIC, in contrast, it can be interpreted as evidence of the truth of the smaller mode. Neither the AIC nor the BIC relies on arbitrarily chosen significance levels.
The remaining criticism of standard hypothesis testing, dependence on sample size, needs more detailed examination. It is sometimes said, as in the passage from Berkson (1938) quoted above, that in large samples, classical hypothesis tests will reject "all" hypotheses. Of course, this is not literally true: They will reject all false hypotheses. It is occasionally possible to find cases in which meaningful hypotheses are not rejected even with very large samples. Cramér (1946:457-61) , despite using a sample of almost one million cases, fails to reject the hypothesis that parents' age has no effect on the sex of their children.
The empirical observation that given a sufficiently large sample, the great majority of hypotheses are rejected, consequently suggests that the great majority of hypotheses are actually false.
Moreover, the tendency to reject all false hypotheses in sufficiently large samples applies to the BIC as well. If a hypothesis is false, the expected value of −2 log L will increase in proportion to N. Although the BIC includes a penalty that increases with sample size, the increase is at the slower rate of log(N). Thus, in a sufficiently large sample, any deviation from the null hypothesis, no matter how trivial, will eventually result in rejection.
The behavior of the BIC as sample size increases can be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose we have a two-by-two table with cell proportions s of .245, .255, .255, and .245 and are considering the hypothesis of independence. It seems safe to say that the association between the variables would generally be regarded as small. Given these proportions and a total sample size of 10,000, −2 log L is 4.00, so that the hypothesis of independence would be rejected at the .05 level. The AIC would also favor the saturated model. The model of independence includes three parameters, for a BIC value of 31.63. The saturated model has a perfect fit but includes four parameters, for a value of 36.84. Thus, the BIC favors the model of independence, and the Bayes factor is about 13.5 to 1 in its favor. With the same proportions and a sample of 100,000, the value of −2 log L increases to 40.0. The BIC for the model of independence is 74.5, while the BIC for the saturated model is 46.1. That is, the BIC now favors the saturated model even more decisively than it had favored the model of independence. Figure 1 illustrates this point by showing log(N) and the value of −2 log L for this case. When log(N) is larger than −2 log L, the BIC favors the model of independence, and where it is smaller, the BIC favors the saturated model. The vertical gap between the lines corresponds to the size of the Bayes factor. Support for the model of independence will increase with a sample size up to N = 2,500, but after that point, the evidence steadily moves in favor of the saturated model. This example illustrates a more general point made by Atkinson (1978:45) . If the null hypothesis is false, the Bayes factor will favor the null hypothesis in samples below a certain size. Beyond this size, it will increasingly favor the alternative hypothesis. This critical size will vary depending on the size of the actual effect and the prior distribution used to represent the alternative hypothesis. Moreover, in part of this region, the apparent evidence in favor of the null hypothesis will increase as the sample size gets larger. Thus, when one obtains a Bayes factor that appears to provide evidence in favor of the null hypothesis, two interpretations are possible: that the null hypothesis is true or that the sample is too small to reveal that it is false. As with classical tests, results that are consistent with the null hypothesis do not have an unambiguous interpretation. Consequently, although the possibility of obtaining positive evidence in favor of a null hypothesis is appealing in principle, it is not clear that Bayesian hypothesis tests actually can provide such evidence, despite the claims of their proponents.
In conclusion, the BIC, and more generally the Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing, does not solve the "problem" of large sample sizes. Even very minor discrepancies from the null hypothesis will eventually result in rejection of the hypothesis, regardless of whether Bayesian or classical tests are used. Since the penalty in the AIC does not increase with sample size, this criterion also clearly favors larger models as the sample increases. Thus, none of the methods considered here provides a way to screen out small but nonzero effects.
CONCLUSIONS
The AIC and the BIC both have significant attractions compared to classical hypothesis tests. In particular, it is convenient to be able to rank models with different degrees of freedom. Like classical tests, however, they will favor increasingly complex models given sufficiently large sample sizes. More precisely, they will favor increasingly complex models if the true model is complex. As discussed above, this seems likely to be the normal situation in the social sciences.
From a theoretical point of view, the tendency to favor complex models in large samples is not a problem. If a parameter is slightly different from zero, then the hypothesis that it is exactly equal to zero is false and should be rejected. However, it does present a practical problem for researchers since it is difficult to understand and explain a model containing a large number of parameters. The theory of hypothesis testing, however, was not intended to deal with the kind of data used in most sociological research. Pearson ([1962] 1966) remarks that he and Neyman regarded "the ideal statistical problem as one in which preliminary planning and subsequent interpretation were linked together-formed part of a single whole. . . . We were much less interested in dealing with situations where the data are thrown at the statistician and he is asked to draw a conclusion" (p. 396). In their "ideal" situation, the researcher would decide to collect only enough data to provide a good chance of rejecting the null hypothesis in the presence of "important" discrepancies. In contemporary sociological research, the data have usually not been collected for the purpose of testing a single specific hypothesis. Consequently, a researcher may have considerably more information than is needed to detect important differences. Moreover, the data may be "uneven": There may be more information than is desired for the estimation of some parameters and less than is desired for others. Consequently, the researcher who wants to omit small effects cannot rely on any existing model selection criterion. There seems to be no alternative to the slower method of examining parameter estimates to see if they are large enough to be of interest.
The choice between the AIC and BIC depends, to some degree, on one's belief in the inherent plausibility of hypotheses of the form θ = 0. If there is a real chance that a hypothesis of this kind is true, the BIC is probably preferable. However, if there is little chance that the null hypothesis is true, it seems better to use the less conservative AIC. This criterion weeds out only those parameters that are so poorly estimated that they detract from the predictive power of the model.
A related question involves the type of hypotheses that should be tested. Substantive hypotheses usually involve claims about the direction of effects-for example, that a variable will have a positive rather than a negative effect. In fact, it is difficult to think of a case in which a theory implies that a variable will have a nonzero effect but does not imply a direction.
13 Some hypotheses involve the relative size of effects-for example, that one independent variable will have a larger effect than another. These can also be thought of as hypotheses concerning direction. Consequently, tests of "two-sided" hypotheses of the form θ < versus θ > 0 might be more appropriate than traditional tests of sharp null hypotheses. As Tukey (1991) suggests, "Statisticians classically asked the wrong question . . . what we should be answering first is 'Can we tell the direction' . . . is it 'up,' 'down,' or 'uncertain'?" (p. 100).
In terms of classical tests, testing the direction of effects merely means using one-tailed rather than two-tailed tests. The effect on Bayes factors, however, is dramatic. As discussed above, in a Bayesian test, p = .05 amounts to little or no evidence against the hypothesis that = 0. In a test of > 0 against < 0, however, it provides strong evidence. If the prior distribution for the hypothesis > 0 is called f ( ), and the prior distribution for < 0 is called g( ), it is natural to assume that the distributions are mirror images-that is, f ( ) = g(− ). If f ( ) is a uniform distribution over all positive values and g( ) is a uniform distribution over all negative values, the Bayes factor is (2 − P )/P , where P is the conventional p value. For example, p = .05 gives odds of 39 to 1; that is, a positive estimate that is significant at conventional levels gives fairly strong evidence for a positive effect, and a negative estimate gives fairly strong evidence for a negative effect.
Rather than using uniform distributions for f ( ) and g( ), it might be more reasonable to use distributions in which the probability declines as the absolute value of increases. This choice amounts to assuming that small values are more likely than large ones. With such distributions, the Bayes factor will approach 1.0 as the probabilities become more concentrated. In the extreme case in which f ( ) is a point mass at some small positive value , and g( ) is a point mass at − , the likelihoods under each hypothesis will be almost the same. Casella and Berger (1987) , however, show that under reasonable assumptions about the distribution, estimates that are significant at conventional levels still provide fairly strong evidence about the direction of an effect. That is, in the case of two-sided hypotheses, Bayesian and classical tests yield similar conclusions: A "significant" estimate in a classical test roughly corresponds to strong evidence about the sign using a Bayes factor.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that the best strategy would be a combination of model selection by the AIC and use of two-sided hypothesis tests to evaluate theoretical predictions. This approach would have significant implications for the practice of research. If two-sided hypothesis tests are used, a theory is supported only if it successfully predicts the sign of a number of parameters. Correctly predicting the sign of a single parameter, even if the hypothesis is strongly supported, is not an impressive accomplishment since a random guess about the sign would have a 50 percent chance of being correct. In contrast, the use of tests of sharp null hypotheses allows researchers to focus on a single parameter since strong rejection of the null hypothesis can be taken as a strong support for a theory.
In conclusion, classical hypothesis tests became the dominant method of model selection by default, not because they were particularly well suited to the task. There is a strong case for turning to penalized likelihood criteria such as the AIC and BIC. Which criterion should be preferred is a more difficult question: The choice is not purely a statistical issue but involves judgments about the purposes of model selection and the nature of social reality. It is hoped that this special issue will not only provide introductions to the AIC and BIC but also help to stimulate discussion on the general question of model selection in sociological research.
